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Introduction
How can Canadian tort law capture unforeseen breaches of privacy that
occur due to technological change? This is one question at the heart of a recent
Ontario Superior Court decision, Jane Doe 464533 v. D. (N.).1 The case
concerned what is colloquially known as ‘‘revenge porn”, where the defendant
publicly shared a sexual video of the plaintiff without consent. Legal experts
celebrated the Court’s initial decision to find the defendant liable for public
disclosure of private facts.2 While the Doe decision is of limited precedential
value, it nonetheless serves as a fruitful site of exploration as Canadian courts
invariably respond to cases dealing with breaches of privacy facilitated by
emerging technology. Indeed, understanding such decisions in light of ever-
changing technological and social norms demonstrates that Canadian courts
should not adopt the tort of public disclosure of private facts, but should instead
embrace a reasonable expectation of privacy test for invasion of privacy claims.
* B.C.L/LL.B Candidate, McGill University Faculty of Law. This paper was originally a
term paper written for a course taught by Professor Margaret Somerville. The author
wishes to thank Professors Robert Leckey, Angela Campbell, Peter Szigeti, Lara
Karaian,ChrisHunt, andAmarKhoday for their very helpful comments on this project.
1 2016 ONSC 541, 2016 CarswellOnt 911 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Doe].
2 MichelleMcQuigge, ‘‘Experts applaud ruling againstmanwho posted ex’s explicit video
online”, CBC News (27 January 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
toronto/explicit-video-ruling-1.3422694>.
Why should a reasonable expectation of privacy test inform the overarching
invasion of privacy tort? To answer this question, Part I summarizes the facts
and judicial history of the Doe decision, and canvasses the legal framework for
personal privacy rights in Canada. Part II demonstrates that the tort of public
disclosure of private facts is ill-equipped to confront unforeseen breaches of
privacy that occur due to technological and social change. Specifically, the
requirement that the publicized matter concern the private life of another suffers
from significant conceptual shortcomings. Instead, the distinction between
‘‘private” and ‘‘public” can be understood as a matter of degree in context. The
tort’s requirement of ‘‘highly offensive” furthermore acts as a limiting qualifier
that ultimately undermines the basis for the action; namely, that invasions of
privacy are an affront to one’s dignity. Instead, whether public disclosures of
private facts violate entrenched normative standards should be one factor in an
invasion of privacy claim. To this end, all Canadian jurisdictions ought to adopt
a reasonable expectation of privacy test to assess invasions of privacy, and can
look to the both the writing of privacy expert Helen Nissenbaum and English
courts to decide the contours of this standard. While such analysis draws
considerably on the work of other privacy experts,3 this case comment offers
critical synthesis in this evolving area of law, and serves as a platform for further
scholarly inquiry.
1. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CONTEXT
1.1 The Facts of Jane Doe 464533 v. D. (N.)
The facts of the Doe decision are simple. The case arose out of a civil liability
claim based on the actions the defendant, ND, who publicly shared a sexually
explicit video of the plaintiff, Jane Doe, without her consent.4 Jane alleged that
ND pressured her into making the sexual video, and promised that no one else
would see the video before she sent it to him.5 She eventually learned that ND
had posted the video on the user submissions section of a pornography website,
calling it: ‘‘college girl pleasures herself for ex boyfriends [sic] delight.”6 ND
posted the video the same day he received it.7 The video was up for
approximately three weeks before he removed it. It is unknown how many
times the video was viewed, downloaded, copied onto media storage devices, and
potentially shared.8 Jane eventually sought compensatory and punitive damages
as well as a permanent injunction to prevent any further such conduct by ND.9
3 In particular, I draw on the work of Chris Hunt, Helen Nissenbaum, and Nicole
Moreham.
4 Doe, supra note 1 at paras. 6 and 8.
5 Ibid, at para. 7.
6 Ibid, at para. 8.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, at para. 10.
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1.2 The Court’s Initial Decision and Reasoning
The Ontario Superior Court (‘‘the Court”) initially ruled in Jane’s favour.
Stinson J., writing for the Court, noted ND to be in default and concluded that
the common law should evolve to recognize the tort of public disclosure of
private facts. He emphasized the practical need for the tort, and observed that
technology has increasingly ‘‘enabled predators and bullies to victimize others by
releasing their nude photos or intimate videos without consent.”10 Justice Stinson
recognized the overarching lack of an available common law remedy and case
law for ‘‘victims” whose sexual or intimate images had been distributed without
their consent.11
Justice Stinson concluded that there are both established and developing
legal grounds to provide civil recourse in such circumstances, and relied heavily
on the landmark Ontario Court of Appeal decision, Jones v Tsige.12 The Court of
Appeal determined that Ontario law ought to recognize the tort of intrusion
upon the seclusion of another’s private affairs or concerns.13 The court in Tsige
established its decision in the principle that the right to privacy is both ‘‘integral
to our social and political order” 14 as well as ‘‘grounded in . . . physical and
moral autonomy” that is ‘‘essential for the well-being of the individual.”15 The
court in Tsige turned to jurisprudence before the Supreme Court of Canada,
recommending that the common law develop in a manner consistent with
Charter values.16 It also emphasized that recent technological change poses a
particularly significant threat to privacy protection.17
The courts in both Tsige and Doe essentially adopted the respective actions
of ‘‘intrusion upon seclusion” and ‘‘public disclosure of private facts” established
9 Ibid, at para. 1.
10 Ibid, at para. 16, likely referring to cases of Rehtaeh Parsons and former judge Lori
Douglas, both of whom were victims of the non-consensual sharing of sexual images or
videos in which theywere depicted. See e.g. ‘‘Rape, bullying led toN.S. teen’s death, says
mom”, CBC News Nova Scotia (9 April 2013), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/nova-scotia/rape-bullying-led-to-n-s-teen-s-death-says-mom-1.1370780> and
‘‘Judge Lori Douglas’s offer to retire early accepted by judicial panel”, CBC News
Manitoba (24 November 2014), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/
judge-lori-douglas-s-offer-to-retire-early-accepted-by-judicial-panel-1.2846980>.
11 Doe, supra note 1 at paras. 18-19.
12 2012 ONCA 32, 2012 CarswellOnt 274 (Ont. C.A.) [Tsige].
13 Ibid, at paras. 65 and 70.
14 Ibid, at para. 68.
15 Ibid, at para. 40, affirming, inter alia, R. v. Dyment, 1988 CarswellPEI 73, 1988
CarswellPEI 7, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.) at 427 [Dyment].
16 Ibid, at para. 45, affirming, inter alia, R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 1986
CarswellBC 411, 1986 CarswellBC 764, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.) at para. 46;
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11[Charter].
17 Tsige, supra note 12 at paras. 67-68.
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in the Restatement of Torts (Second), which persuasively restates common law
trends and recommendations for American courts.18 Justice Stinson adopted a
modified version of the tort of public disclosure of private facts as follows:
‘‘One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of the other’s
privacy, if the matter publicized or the act of publication a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public.”19
Justice Stinson held that the cause of Jane’s action had been made out. ND
had ‘‘made public an aspect of the plaintiff’s private life” when he posted ‘‘a
privately-shared and highly personal intimate video recording of the plaintiff” on
the internet.20 Further, Justice Stinson found that a ‘‘reasonable person would
find such activity, involving unauthorized public disclosure of such a video to be
highly offensive” and that ‘‘[i]t is readily apparent that there was no legitimate
public concern in him doing so.”21 Justice Stinson, analogizing Jane’s harm to
sexual battery, granted injunctive relief and awarded her $50,000 for general
damages, $25,000 for aggravated damages, and $25,000 for punitive damages,
including both the costs of the action and the motion on a full-indemnity basis.22
1.3 Procedural Developments: A Learning Opportunity
In January 2017, the Court dismissed Jane’s motion for leave to appeal from
its previous decisions, which set aside both the finding of ND’s liability and
Justice Stinson’s previous assessment of damages.23 Such decisions offer
fascinating glimpses into key pressing procedural issues before the Court, yet
an explanation of the Court’s latest reasoning is unwarranted for this comment’s
purposes. However, the Court’s dismissal did indeed overturn the Court’s
establishment and interpretation of the tort of public disclosure of private facts.
Despite these procedural developments, the Doe decision affords Canadian
jurists a rich learning opportunity. Out of Commonwealth and American
jurisdictions, Canadian courts have been particularly cautious in their adoption
of personal privacy torts.24 We therefore have the dual benefit and challenge of
crafting our privacy tort(s) in light of those who have come before us,
18 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 652D (1977) [Restatement]; Meg Kribble,
‘‘Secondary Sources: ALRs, Encyclopedias, Law Reviews, Restatements, & Treatises”,
Harvard Law School Library (guide), online: <http://guides.library.harvard.edu/
c.php?g=309942&p=2070280>.
19 Doe, supra note 1 at para. 46, modification shown by underlining, emphasis added.
20 Ibid, at para. 47.
21 Ibid, emphasis added.
22 Ibid, at paras. 53-65.
23 JaneDoe 464533 v.D. (N.), 2017ONSC127, 2017CarswellOnt 163 (Ont. S.C.J.). at 101.
102.r shared material and y accessedlikely inge ation ing employee eamil es. s codified in
the ical need for
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particularly with a commitment to capturing unexpected breaches of privacy
made possible by emerging technologies and social change.
1.4 Canadian Privacy Law
Everyone in Canada has the right to freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure under section 8 of the Charter.25 The Criminal Code was amended in 2014
to include a new offence of ‘‘publication of an intimate image without
consent”,26 which was not available to Jane when she brought her claim to court.
Canada also has a complex ‘‘patchwork” set of private sector,27 public
sector,28 and sector-specific29 privacy laws.30 Four common law provinces
(Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador)
currently have legislation that establishes a tort of invasion of privacy, and each
are similar to one another.31 Specifically, all four statutes refer to the importance
of the nature and degree of the plaintiff’s privacy entitlement, which is
circumscribed by what is “reasonable in the circumstances.”32 The personal
right to privacy under Quebec law is explicitly protected by arts. 3 and 35-37 of
the Civil Code of Quebec33 and s. 5 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms.34
The Intimate Image Protection Act came into force in Manitoba in January
2016, and expressly created a new tort of nonconsensual distribution of intimate
images.35 The Act defines an intimate image as one that has been recorded in
circumstances that gave rise to a ‘‘reasonable expectation of privacy” in the
picture or recording at the time it was distributed.36
24 Chris D.L. Hunt, ‘‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario
court of Appeal’s Decision in Jones v Tsige” (2012) 37:2 Queen’s L.J. 665 at 667.
25 Charter, supra note 16.
26 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended at s. 162.1.
27 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5.
28 Personal Health Information Protection Act, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Schedule A; Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31; Municipal Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56.
29 See e.g. Consumer Reporting Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.33.
30 Lisa R. Lifshitz, ‘‘A New Tort is Born! Ontario Recognizes its First Privacy Tort”,
Business Law Today (March 2012) 1, online: <https://www.americanbar.org/publica-
tions/blt/2012/03/keeping_current.html>.
31 Tsige, supra note 12 at para. 52;PrivacyAct, R.S.M. 1987, c. P125;PrivacyAct, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 373; Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24; and Privacy Act, R.S.N.L., 1990, c. P-22
[referring to all legislation as Privacy Acts].
32 PrivacyActs, supra note 31;Daniel Burnett, ‘‘Privacy Torts in CommonLawProvinces”
(1998) online: <http://www.adidem.org/Privacy_Torts_in_Common_Law_Provin-
ces>, emphasis added [This source is no longer available at this address].
33 Civil Code of Québec, arts. 3 and 35-37 C.C.Q.
34 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, C.Q.L.R. c. C-12 s. 5.
35 The Intimate Image Protection Act, S.M. 2015, c. 42, C.C.S.M. c. I87, at s. 11(1) [IIPA].
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2. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE DOE DECISION
There is no doubt that the court’s decision to develop the tort of invasion of
privacy in the present case was welcome. Nevertheless, there are difficulties in the
Doe decision that may undermine the tort’s effectiveness for future claims,
particularly with respect to unanticipated breaches enabled by new technologies.
Privacy and common law expert Chris Hunt came to a similar conclusion in his
analysis of Tsige.37 Indeed, two key problems that he analyzed in his critical
appraisal of that case are equally problems in this decision and warrant analysis
here.
2.1 Public and Private: A Matter of Degree, in Context
The distinction between private and public may best be understood as a
matter of degree in context rather than kind; such arguments are not new.38
Recall that a key element of this tort is the distribution of another’s private
facts.39 This element of the tort operates as a definitional filter, and is typically
contrasted with public facts.40 But when used descriptively, this test offers little
clarity due to its assumption that these two concepts are in stark contrast with
one another.41 Instead, any perceived bright line between private and public
ought to be reconsidered, because these concepts are not mutually exclusive
categories, but are instead generally matters of degree existing on a continuum.42
The presumed dichotomy of public versus private can reflect a logical error,
notably the ‘‘fallacy of bifurcation.”43 Numerous examples illustrate this fallacy.
Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Statutory Officer at the New Zealand Ministry of
Justice, pointed to public records in New Zealand, such as birth and death
certificates that are always available for public inspection but are also private,
since most are never accessed and remain hidden from public view.44 Information
science and privacy expert Helen Nissenbaum particularly observed that new
36 Ibid, at s. 1(1), emphasis added.
37 Hunt, supra note 24.
38 Duncan Kennedy, ‘‘The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction” (1982)
130 U. Pa. L.R. 1349; Jeff Alan Weintraub & Krishan Kumar, Public and Private in
Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997); Anne Deegan, ‘‘The Public/Private Law Dichotomy and its
Relationship with the Policy/Operational Factors Distinction in Tort Law” (2001) 18
Q.U.T. Law J.Jl., online: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/QUTLawJJl/2001/
18.html>.
39 Doe, supra note 1.
40 Hunt, supra note 24 at 682.
41 Ibid, at 682.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, at 683.
44 Ibid; Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, “Private Circles and Public Squares: Invasion of Privacy
by the Publication of ’Private Facts’” (1998) 61:3 Mod. L. Rev. at 327.
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technologies reveal the fuzziness of such definitions.45 One excellent question is
whether posts or messages on social media websites constitute private or public
information,46 a proper determination of which would likely hinge on such
factors as the degree of publicness of any written or shared material. Another
example concerns the status of online activity in the workplace such as accessing
email and the internet, which was conceived in the early 1990s as personal and
inviolate.47 Yet what was once private in the workplace is increasingly open to
monitoring by employers and their representatives.48 Finally, legislation such as
the USA Patriot Act has given government agencies far greater leeway to
infiltrate a broad variety of spheres previously considered private, including
digital bank, telephone, and even library records.49
Canadian courts ought to consider Nissenbaum’s three dimensions of the
public/private distinction, which determines the degree of privacy in light of (1)
the actors, which she divides into government and private actors; (2) the
dimension of realm, including geographic and abstract spaces that can also be
divided into the public and private; and (3) the type or nature of information,
which can be divided into public or personal.50 Analysis of the third dimension
would be particularly helpful in determining the scope and extent of privacy
protection when distributed information or material is at issue.51 This is because
it can help courts to determine whether the material at hand was already known
to the world at large, or whether it is of legitimate concern to the public.
2.2 Problems with the ‘‘Highly Offensive” Standard
Canadian courts should abandon the high offensiveness criterion, which not
only compromises the very basis of the action — to recognize invasions of
privacy that are an affront to one’s dignity — but also threatens to be both
overbroad and under-inclusive when it comes to technological advancements.
Recall that Justice Stinson adopted a modified version of the Restatement
standard: a defendant will be liable if they disclose matters concerning the private
life of another, so long as the act of publication or even the matter itself
publicized would be ‘‘highly offensive to a reasonable person.”52 The court in
Tsige, echoing the Restatement, held that the qualifier of ‘‘highly offensive”
attempts to act as a limiting principle, excluding claims brought by ‘‘individuals
45 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social
Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) at 101.
46 Ibid, at 102.
47 Ibid, at 101.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid, at 102.
50 Ibid, at 96.
51 Ibid, at 96-98.
52 Doe, supra note 1 at para. 46, modification shown by underlining.
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who are sensitive or unusually concerned about their privacy” and intrusions
that are not ‘‘significant.”53
Hunt, drawing on the work of fellow privacy law expert Nicole Moreham,
asserted that the high offensiveness standard obscures the fact that protecting
privacy is integrally bound up with the dignity of the individual.54 Moreham
defines dignity as the principle that one should respect the intrinsic value of all
persons, and seek, insofar as possible, to further their ends as well as one’s own.55
Therefore to treat someone ‘‘merely as something to be looked at, listened to,
found out about, or reported on” against their wishes is therefore to ignore their
right to respect as a person.56 An individual’s subjective sense of dignity is quite
plainly too broad and protean a basis upon which to build a legal action (indeed
an objective test will always be needed).57 Yet, Canadian courts ought to inform
their development and application of personal privacy tort law with an
understanding of the dignitary nature of the privacy interest.58
Many decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada already recognize the
relationship between privacy and dignity. In the landmark decision of R. v. Plant,
Sopinka J. held that dignity, integrity, and autonomy underlie the right to
informational privacy;59 that is, the right to communicate or retain all
information about a person, as such information is in a fundamental way
one’s own.60 While the Charter does not apply to common law disputes between
private individuals, the Supreme Court has both expounded the principle that the
common law should develop in a manner consistent with Charter values, and
determined that the perseveration of dignity is a core value that underpins the
right to privacy.61
The high offensiveness standard also has the effect of distracting courts from
the dignitary interest at stake in privacy claims, and focuses instead on irrelevant
53 Tsige, supra note 12 at para. 72.
54 Hunt, supranote 24 at 689, citingNicoleMoreham, ‘‘Why is Privacy Important? Privacy,
Dignity and Development of the New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort” in Finn, J. &
Todd, S. (eds), Law Liberty, Legislation: Essays in Honour of John Burrows Q.C.,
(Wellington: LexisNexis, 2008) at 231.
55 Moreham, supra, at 236.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, at 238.
58 Ibid.
59 R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 566, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) at
293, affirmed R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt
4352 (S.C.C.) at para. 25 [Tessling].
60 Tsige, supra note 12 at para. 41, affirming Tessling, supra note 59 at para. 23.
61 See e.g. R. v. Saeed, 2016 SCC 24, 2016 CarswellAlta 1145, 2016 CarswellAlta 1146
(S.C.C.); R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 17202, 2014 CarswellOnt 17203
(S.C.C.); R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, 2010 CarswellAlta 2269, 2010 CarswellAlta 2270
(S.C.C.); R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, 2001 CarswellOnt 4253, 2001 CarswellOnt 4301
(S.C.C.); Dyment, supra note 15.
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considerations. For example, New Zealand courts satisfying the highly offensive
element have scrutinized the tone of the publicity, analyzing whether it cast the
plaintiff in a positive or embarrassing light.62 In the case of Andrews v Television
New Zealand, the court there held that the broadcast of detailed car crash
footage did not meet the standard of ‘‘highly offensive”, despite the plaintiffs
having a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the conversations at
the time.63 In essence, the broadcast was not highly offensive because it did not
make the plaintiffs ‘‘look bad.”64 Moreham compellingly argues that the
defendant’s decision to turn a private trauma into a public spectacle was the crux
of the issue, and not whether the tone of the feature presented the plaintiff in a
positive or negative light.65 If privacy is fundamentally linked to dignity then all
breaches would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.66 By including the
highly offensive requirement, courts relying on the initial Doe decision are likely
to focus on inappropriate questions, distracting from the dignitary nature of the
privacy interest.
The high offensiveness standard is liable to be both overbroad and under-
inclusive regarding new circumstances made possible by emerging technologies.
One critical problem in the Doe decision: Justice Stinson never clarified the test
for high offensiveness. Indeed, the Court merely held that a judge can find both
the act of publication or the material itself highly offensive in order to constitute
an invasion of privacy.67 It is startling that the court retained the latter element.
This benchmark in Doe can effectively operate as an appeal to a judge’s
instinctive feeling about what material ought to be publicly shared or not,68 and
what deserves protection under Canadian privacy law. It is not difficult to see
that by deciding that the publicized matter is itself highly offensive, judges make
value-laden determinations of the societal acceptance of all kinds of
material—whether it involves, for example, nude images or videos shared
through electronic means, or conversations of a sexual nature that occurred in
the digital sphere. By affording judges such significant leeway in the
determination of high offensiveness, the tort of public disclosure of private
facts allows judges to find liability concerning the sharing of any sort of material
that they might not approve of. For these reasons, future courts should reject the
inclusion of the high offensiveness standard.
The highly offensive threshold is also insufficient insofar as it leads to under-
inclusivity with respect to technological development, but courts can begin to
62 Moreham, supra note 54 at 241, citingAndrews v. Television NewZealand, [2006] NZHC
1586 (N.Z.H.C.) [Andrews].
63 Andrews, ibid..
64 Moreham, supra note 54 at 241.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid, at 243.
67 Doe, supra note 1 at para. 46.
68 Moreham, supra note 54 at 246.
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remedy this by considering contextual factors. Indeed, clarification in the
Restatement states that ‘‘[t]he protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in
[their] privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to the
occupation of the plaintiff, and to the habits of [their] neighbors and fellow
citizens.”69 Nissenbaum cogently argued that judges should consider examining
the level of commonness of using such technology in a given context; if such use is
known; and whether the particular use of the technology in question violates or
conforms to relevant context-specific norms.70
Judges will undoubtedly find such contextual analysis particularly useful in
the context of new technology. Consider the following seemingly innocuous types
of technical systems: closed-circuit television (CCTV) used in public spaces, radio
frequency identification (RFID) increasingly installed in consumer and
government service items, the mining of large aggregated databases, the use of
thermal imaging to detect heat patterns emanating from residences, and facial
recognition software.71 Nissenbaum reminds us that judges cannot generalize
from the observation that certain uses of technology in certain contexts are
commonplace, accepted, and supported, in order to conclude that all such uses
will not violate the right to privacy.72 In other words, judges cannot merely assess
how common a given technology is and how familiar people are with them, but
must instead analyze whether its use in a particular context, in a particular way is
so unusual as to indicate that the publication has violated standing societal
conventions.73 In so doing, judges are far better equipped to assess invasions of
privacy through their discretion and wisdom, paired with determining both
relevant norms and eventually which cases constitute reasonable analogies and
which do not.74
2.3 A Promising Standard: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Canadian courts should determine invasions of privacy through a standard
that prioritizes such detailed contextual analysis as the reasonable expectation of
privacy test. More specifically, this test is sensitive to the plaintiff’s own views in
order to respond to the essentially subjective nature of privacy.75 And as
mentioned above, the test must also comprise an objective facet to avoid a tort
that is insupportably broad.76 The current approach in English law satisfies each
of these criteria.
69 Restatement, supra note 18.
70 Nissenbaum, supra note 45 at 235.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid, at 234-235.
74 Ibid, at 235.
75 Hunt, supra note 24 at 686.
76 Ibid.
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Hunt compellingly argues that Canadian courts’ efforts are in fact better
served by following the influence of the newer, more principled developments in
England than by adopting the bifurcated and categorical analysis of the
American model.77 Indeed, English courts — cautious in their recognition and
development of the tort of invasion of privacy78 — have rejected the ‘‘highly
offensive” approach in favour of the reasonable expectation of privacy test.79
English courts employ what functions as a subjective-objective analysis. They
consider all the circumstances relating to the particular individual — including
their expectations in relation to the information or activity in question — and use
the objective element to assess whether, in the circumstances, these expectations
are reasonable.80 The test, taken here from the English Court of Appeal decision,
Murray v Express Newspapers, can include analysis of elements such as :
1) the attributes of the claimant,
2) the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged,
3) the place at which it was happening,
4) the nature and purpose of the intrusion,
5) the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred,
6) the effect on the claimant, and
7) the circumstances in which and 8) the purposes for which the information
came into the hands of the publisher.81
Courts could incorporate Nissenbaum’s contextual factors regarding
emerging technologies into the second element, which evaluates the nature of
the activity in which the defendant was engaged.
The benefits of adopting the reasonable expectation of privacy test are
numerous. First, the reasonable expectation of privacy test offers Canadian
courts a far more effective analytical toolkit with which to assess invasions of
privacy facilitated by technological and social change than does the bifurcated
and categorical Restatement approach. By first framing the inquiry from the
plaintiff’s perspective, this test allows judges to take stock of the plaintiff’s
subjective expectations, thereby responding to the underlying, subjective reasons
as to why an invasion of privacy claim can arise82 — all while particularly
77 Ibid, at 667.
78 Ibid, at 666.
79 SeeCampbell v.MGNLtd., [2004]UKHL22 (U.K.H.L.) at paras. 21-22;Mosley v.News
Group, [2008] EWHC1777 (available onQL) (Q.B.) at para. 7;LNS v. PersonsUnknown,
[2010] EWHC 119, [2010] 1 FCR 659 (Q.B.) at para. 55; Regina ex rel Wood v.
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [2009] EWCACiv 414 at para. 34, [2010] 2 LRC 184
(C.A.) at paras. 24-25.
80 Hunt, supra note 24 at 687, citingHilaryDelany&EoinCarolan,TheRight toPrivacy:A
Doctrinal and Comparative Analysis (Dublin: Thompson Round Hall, 2008) at 299.
81 Murray v. ExpressNewspapers plc., [2008] EWCACiv 446, [2009]Ch 481 (C.A.) at paras.
35-36, emphasis added.
82 Hunt, supra note 24 at 687.
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keeping in mind the importance of ensuring individual dignity. The objective
aspect makes clear to both judges and parties before the court that prevailing
social norms are critical markers informing the assessment of whether a claim has
been established.83 In contrast, while judges are also bound to consider social
norms under the high offensiveness standard, the two-step reasonable
expectation of privacy test explicitly accounts for this factor and thus
promotes predictability.
Second, the test is flexible and inherently well-positioned to respond to
unforeseen privacy threats arising from technological and social changes,84
avoiding the problems of being overbroad and under-inclusive that characterizes
the standard of ‘‘highly offensive.”
Third, a reasonable expectation of privacy test already exists in Canadian
tort law with respect to personal privacy claims. Recall that the four provincial
statutes establishing the tort of invasion of privacy all refer to the importance of
the nature and degree of the plaintiff’s privacy entitlement, which is
circumscribed by what is “reasonable in the circumstances.”85 By adopting the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, Canadian courts espouse a benchmark
that works in concert with a key standard set out across relevant Canadian
personal privacy legislation. Further analysis of case law under the various
Canadian privacy statutes is beyond the scope of this comment, but is fertile
ground for future scholarly research.
Finally, a ‘‘reasonable expectation of privacy” is the core legal notion that
underpins the analytical framework for privacy violations under the Charter.
Canadian courts are thus familiar with this concept, and drawing on it in
personal privacy claims certainly does not break new ground. And despite the
fact that the Charter is not directly applicable in private law cases, Canadian
judges are required to develop the common law in accordance with Charter
values. Indeed, there is a growing body of jurisprudence demonstrating the
desirability for courts to update the law of personal privacy to reflect both
modern circumstances and the values that underlie the Charter.86
CONCLUSION
This comment has demonstrated that Canadian courts should assess invasion
of privacy tort claims by prioritizing contextual analysis. We have much to learn
from the Doe decision: a bifurcated view of the public/private dichotomy and the
highly offensive standard both call into question the ability of the invasion of
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid, at 688.
85 Privacy Acts, supra note 31.
86 M. (A.) v. Ryan, 1997 CarswellBC 100, 1997 CarswellBC 99, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157
(S.C.C.), at paras. 30 and 45;Carter v. Connors, 2009 NBQB 317, 2009 CarswellNB 632,
2009 CarswellNB 728 (N.B. Q.B.), at paras. 26-33 and 42.
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privacy tort to capture unforeseen privacy breaches facilitated by ever-changing
technological and social conditions.
Canadian courts can understand the notions of public and private as
matters of degree, by evaluating the publicness of the actor, geographic or
abstract space, and type or nature of information at hand. Courts should develop
and apply the invasion of privacy tort with a commitment to preserving dignity
as a fundamental aspect of the right to privacy. Also, judicial discretion cannot
be unfettered: the highly offensive standard adopted by the Doe decision is
overbroad and ought to be rejected because it enables courts to find liability
simply due to holding the publicized material itself to be highly offensive. The
high offensiveness threshold is inadequate and also risks being under-inclusive
particularly when it comes to technological and social change. Courts can
remedy such deficiencies by analyzing how and when technology is used in a
certain context, and the unusualness of such usage.
The modern, principled English approach offers a hopeful way forward for
Canadian courts, which should lay to rest the conceptually flawed Restatement
approach. Instead, they should embrace the reasonable expectation of privacy
test, which overcomes these problems by enabling Canadian tort law to capture
unexpected privacy breaches that will inevitably occur through technological and
social change.
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